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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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(Information as of noon EST, 2 January 1969)

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
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## FAR EAST

The Vietnamese Communists, during this period of impasse in Paris over seating and other procedural arrangements, are confining themselves mainly to nurturing the image of the Liberation Front as an independent entity and a valid spokesman for South Vietnam. They also pass up few opportunities to enlarge upon alleged differences between Saigon and Washington over negotiating tactics.

On the Saigon side, Vice President Ky's return to Paris may at least be delayed; there is some speculation that he may not return at all. The government's unity appears imperiled not only by differences over tactics to be pursued by South Vietnam in the Paris talks but also by strong undercurrents of friction between Ky and Prime Minister Huong.

Fighting in South Vietnam was light this week. The Communists generally observed their own three-day New Year's truce. There continue to be indications, however, that the enemy is getting into position for more intensive activity should Hanoi conclude that it would be propitious.

In the inevitable jockeying for power in advance of the Chinese Communists' ninth party congress, radical elements in the leadership are scoring a few points. Harsh Maoist programs are moving into high gear in the countryside and may have a seriously disturbing effect. The new upheaval in some areas caused by this latest radical backlash may at the least force a delay in holding the party congress, thought to have been tentatively set for early spring.

The Chinese, meanwhile, are pushing ahead with their road construction in northwest Laos. Recent aerial photography shows that the road being built southward from Ban Botene is now motorable to within five miles of the Pathet Lao stronghold of Muong Sai. Government guerrillas in the area claim as many as five Chinese battalions have been brought in to provide security for construction workers. [REDACTED]

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## VIETNAM

Communist military activity this week closely followed the pattern of the previous week, with a mid-week holiday standdown that was called for and generally observed by the enemy. Most ground fighting was the result of Communist reaction to allied military operations against enemy troop concentrations and routes to target areas. Communist mortar and rocket crews continued their harassing attacks, especially in northern III Corps.

Allied forces, which did not schedule a New Year's ceasefire, continued to disrupt enemy efforts to set up offensive actions.

### Communist Political Developments

The Communists have continued to work hard to bolster the image of the Liberation Front as Saigon's equal. While the allied delegations consulted with their governments and with each other during the past week, the Communists in one forum after another castigated Saigon for obstructing the talks. The Communists renewed the call for a replacement of the Thieu government with a "peace cabinet" that would sit down and negotiate with the Communists in Paris. Hanoi openly warned the US in one broadcast that even if the procedural hassle were resolved, there was little prospect of progress on substantive issues as long as

Saigon clung to its present "attitudes."

Using every opportunity to contrast Saigon's alleged intransigence with their own "good intentions," the Hanoi - Liberation Front delegation in Paris issued a joint communiqué on December 26 claiming that a round table was a real and probably final compromise on the part of the Communists on seating arrangements. They hinted broadly, however, that if the allies accepted it, the Communists were prepared to be flexible on other procedural problems.

Throughout the week, the efforts to tear down Saigon's reputation and to feed its suspicions of Washington's intentions were coupled with maneuvers designed to strengthen the position of the Liberation Front. The Communists pressed for additional meetings between Front and US representatives on the prisoner issue, and gave extensive publicity to the reception of the head of the Front delegation in Paris at the French Foreign Ministry. The Front also talked up their local revolutionary committees as an effective challenge to Saigon's authority in the countryside. In a series of interviews granted this week, the head of the Front delegation implied that these local Communist administrative authorities blanketed practically all of South Vietnam, and predicted that the

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Front would set up a national government to rival Saigon. He was purposefully vague as to the timing of such a move, however.

Political Developments in  
South Vietnam

Following the return of Vice President Ky to Saigon for consultations, the South Vietnamese have begun a propaganda campaign to convince world opinion that it is the unyielding attitude of the Communists that is delaying progress in Paris. Government spokesmen are emphasizing that South Vietnam has already made many concessions, including agreeing to a round table, "provided the character of a two-sided negotiation is reflected physically."

In what appears to be a further effort to reduce impatience in the US, President Thieu has publicly announced that he believes some US troop withdrawals will be possible in 1969 in view of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities. His confidence in his country's growing self-reliance is reminiscent of

the attitude that prevailed before the Tet offensive last February, however, and would probably be severely weakened by a major new Communist offensive.

Meanwhile, the delegation's morale is undoubtedly low as a result of the pressures it has encountered in Paris and a lack of support from the home front. The dismissal of 12 staff members of the delegation from their regular Saigon jobs is virtually certain to be interpreted as a slap at Ky and his friends, and will weaken the delegation's prestige in Saigon.

Ky has let it be known that he is considering not returning to Paris, probably in the hope of getting assurances from both Thieu and the US that his services are valued. There is little indication that he has made any progress in returning some of his supporters to key positions in the regime or has otherwise made any political capital, as he hoped he would when he agreed to go to Paris. [REDACTED]

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## INDONESIA PREPARES FOR WEST IRIAN VOTE

Indonesia is trying to eliminate dissident groups in West Irian in order to ensure an orderly vote favorable to Djakarta in this year's "self-determination" election.

Indonesia is required to let the West Irianese determine their future status, either independence or union with Indonesia, before the end of this year under terms of the 1962 "New York Agreement." This agreement ended the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the former Dutch territory of New Guinea and transferred its administration to Indonesia. Since its administration began in May 1963, Djakarta has encountered consistent local agitation against union with Indonesia. This resistance has been increased by the central government's neglect of the area and exploitation by local Indonesian administrators.

The anti-Indonesian movement includes a poorly armed but persistent guerrilla organization of some 2,500 men, which the Indonesians have been unable to flush out of the jungle. The Djakarta government now believes, however, that it is making progress

through amnesty offers and negotiations. One of West Irian's three major rebel leaders, along with approximately 700 of his followers, surrendered in early December after a government-offered amnesty. A second leader has sent representatives to Djakarta to discuss possible surrender terms.

In parallel moves to improve its image, Djakarta has begun introducing more consumer goods into West Irian and upgrading the caliber of its military and administrative personnel. Djakarta's resources are limited, however, and administering the territory places added pressures on the government's already strained finances.

The opposition, expecting a rigged vote, is apparently now trying to get on record as objecting to the manner in which Indonesia plans to conduct the self-determination election. The Indonesians intend to have the votes cast by hand-picked district representatives and traditional tribal chiefs who can be made to see the practicality of voting to remain with Indonesia.

A United Nations representative, who will participate in establishing procedures for the voting, is apparently sympathetic to Indonesia's objectives. He desires, however, that the voting be carried out in a manner that will not invite suspicion of undue manipulation. Presumably, Indonesia will delay the voting until near the end of 1969.



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## RADICAL FORCES IN CHINA SHOW NEW STRENGTH

Since the October plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, radical elements in the leadership apparently have been able to seize the initiative on some issues. Extreme social programs advocated by Mao Tse-tung have been intensified, despite the social and political unrest they create. It is possible that the regime will postpone again the overdue party congress, which has been tentatively set for early spring. A People's Daily editorial on 31 December confirmed that the congress would be held in 1969, but did not specify a date.

In the jockeying for power almost certainly going on in advance of this congress, the radicals have scored a few points. Radiobroadcasts from two provinces claim that some provincial leaders opposed by the radical Cultural Revolution Group in Peking were recently "exposed." Although nobody was named, one man is almost certainly Wang En-mao, long-time military and party leader in Sinkiang. During the Cultural Revolution, radical forces have made repeated attempts to dislodge Wang, but have had no apparent success.

Meanwhile, harsh Maoist programs are moving into high gear in rural areas and may have a seriously disturbing effect. A recent directive by Mao to push the Cultural Revolution in the countryside this coming winter and

spring is being interpreted in at least one province as a demand to launch a large-scale purge of "class enemies." A Shensi broadcast of 25 December said that in response to Mao's demand, the military planned to send squads of troops to all villages to help "clean out" the large number of spies, traitors, landlords, and other "bad elements" who allegedly still exist. A similar campaign conducted recently in Kwangtung resulted in thousands of executions, often after public tortures.

The transfer of urban dwellers to the countryside--begun on a large scale last fall, partly to satisfy Mao's long-standing conviction that heavy physical labor is good ideological training for everyone--was given another spur on 21 December with the publication of a new Mao "instruction" on the subject. According to provincial broadcasts, entire families will now be resettled, not just high-school-age youth and cadres, the previous targets of the campaign. Some reports suggest that as much as one fourth of the population of large cities will be dispersed. This forced emigration has added to the army's burden of maintaining public order in rural areas, because it is deeply resented by both the emigrants and their unwilling hosts in already overpopulated communes. In some communes near Canton, troops are being permanently assigned to keep people in line.

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## EUROPE

The tension in the Middle East has encouraged new Soviet diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving some movement toward a political settlement of the area's problems. There have been some signs of flexibility in Moscow's position, although it conforms closely with the aims of the Arab nations and probably has Cairo's approval. The USSR has avoided the excessive harshness that would damage its diplomatic efforts, however, and appears genuinely interested in working with the Western powers to patch together the elements of a political settlement.

Federalization came quietly to Czechoslovakia this week. Some new faces showed up among the leadership, but there were no real surprises. The leaders skirted the issue of the future of progressive assembly president Smrkovsky, whose fate will be decided later this month. The visit by a Soviet party delegation to Czechoslovakia this week seemed aimed at strengthening conservative elements at lower levels in the Czechoslovak party—a technique the Soviets have increasingly used to influence top-level policy and appointments in Prague.

Political differences between the Russians and Yugoslavs over the invasion of Czechoslovakia have not unduly affected their bilateral economic relations. The two countries have just signed their annual trade protocol, and it provides for an optimistic increase in trade above that of 1968.

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Year-end interviews of Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt revealed differences in tone over prospects for negotiations between Bonn and Moscow in the coming year.

The newly confirmed Italian foreign minister, Pietro Nenni, says that Rome intends to sign the nonproliferation treaty soon, a move delayed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Portuguese foreign minister has announced that his government wants to reopen negotiations with the US to renew the Azores base agreement, which ran out in 1962 and has since been replaced only by an informal understanding. In return, Lisbon probably will press the US to be more sympathetic toward its position in Africa.

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## SOVIETS WARM UP TO BONN AND THE WEST

Moscow is taking a somewhat more amiable line toward Bonn as it works to undo the damage done by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Fence-mending apart, in its current diplomacy toward the West, Moscow also has one eye on the new US administration, and would prefer to be as free as possible of accumulated diplomatic burdens. Not far below the surface, too, is Soviet fear of China's troublemaking capability, which encourages Moscow to damp down tension on its Western flank.

Moscow has muted its anti-US propaganda in general, and has carefully avoided criticism of the President-elect. The Soviets have stressed restoration of their rapport with France. They have also made protestations of goodwill to the Italians, the Dutch, and the Belgians, and have cozied up quietly to the European Community. Soviet propaganda continues to bully the UK, however, probably because of the relatively low premium on good Anglo-Soviet relations in the short run.

In what amounts to a tactical about-face, after months of hurling abuse at Bonn after Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have moved to resume negotiations of a civil air agreement with West Germany. They have also intimated that they are ready to resume talks on exchanging declarations renouncing the use of force.

Alternate use of the carrot and the stick is a well-established feature of Soviet dealings with the

West Germans, and the current version is likely to be no more than another tactical maneuver designed to play on differences within the Western alliance. The USSR is well aware that Bonn fears the prospect of far-reaching talks between Moscow and the new US administration. The Soviets also sense Bonn's keen interest in salvaging something of the Eastern diplomacy it had been pursuing before Czechoslovakia.

The Russians have sweetened their civil air proposal by offering Bonn coveted onward flight rights from Moscow to points in the Far East. The USSR will be less responsive to West Germany's request for membership in an expanded Geneva disarmament conference, however. The Russians, certain to set a high price even to admit Bonn as an observer, are likely to demand West German ratification of the nonproliferation treaty and equal status at Geneva for East Germany.

Bonn's designation of West Berlin as the site for election of the federal president in March is likely to put the current trend in Soviet - West German relations to an early test. Bonn's move implies difficulties with the Soviets and East Germans, who have warned against such "provocations." The first Soviet reaction, in the form of an oral protest to Allied ambassadors in Moscow, seems to have been essentially for the record, however, and in the nature of an appeal to desist.

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
## CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FEDERALIZE DESPITE EMERGING PROBLEMS

The federalization of Czechoslovakia, which splits the country into two semiautonomous Czech and Slovak states under a streamlined central government in Prague, went into effect on 1 January. Announcements of the formation of a new federal government, however, failed to mention the status of National Assembly President Josef Smrkovsky. The issue of his continuing in his position has generated considerable friction between the Czechs and Slovaks, and it probably will not be settled until a new federal assembly is formed later this month.

Both the new federal government and the Slovak national government have brought in young, competent officials, but the new personnel assignments contain no surprises. Only two of the seven heads of federal ministries are new appointees. Jan Marko, a Slovak technologist, was named minister of foreign affairs--though he has no experience in this area--while Jan Tabacek, a Slovak economist-technologist, was designated minister of foreign trade. Marko is said to be a "compromise" candidate who was selected over a pro-Soviet hard liner nominated by conservative leader Vasil Bilak.

The status of Smrkovsky has become a cause celebre. Many Slovak organizations have backed Slovak party boss Husak's demand that a Slovak fill one of the top three positions in the federal government. Inasmuch as Presi-

dent Svoboda and Premier Cernik have already been confirmed in their posts, the Slovaks are in effect calling for Smrkovsky's ouster.



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Students, workers, farmers, and intellectuals have threatened to demonstrate en masse if any of the liberals in the leadership--particularly Smrkovsky--are dropped, or if Dubcek's reform program is further compromised.

Another ranking Soviet party delegation arrived in Prague on 26 December as part of a continuing Russian effort to keep in close touch with Czechoslovak officials during the period of "normalization." The eight-member Soviet delegation, heavily weighted with party professionals, was headed by Konstantin Katushev, central committee secretary for relations with other Communist parties. It also included first deputy foreign minister Vasily Kuznetsov, who served as Moscow's troubleshooter in Prague after the invasion. The delegation has met mostly with Czechoslovak conservatives, and one of the aims of the visit is no doubt to strengthen these conservative forces in the Czechoslovak party.

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Changes in Bulgarian Council of Ministers  
27 December 1968

Chairman (Premier): Zhivkov, Todor  
First Deputy Chairman: Zhivkov, Zhivko  
Deputy Chairmen: Avramov, Luchezar  
Kubadinski, Pencho  
Mikhaylov, Ivan  
Tanchev, Petur  
Tsolov, Tano

MINISTRIES

~~Chemistry and Metallurgy~~  
Communications

~~Finance~~  
Foreign Affairs  
Foreign Trade  
Forests and Forest Industry

~~Internal Trade~~  
Justice

~~Light Industry~~  
Machine Building  
National Defense  
National Education  
Power and Fuel  
Public Health

~~Supply and State Reserves~~  
Transport

Committees  
Art and Culture

~~Economic Coordination~~

State Committee for Science and  
Technical Progress  
State Control  
State Planning Committee

~~New organization~~

MINISTERS

~~Pavlov, Georgi~~  
Tonchev, Stoyan

~~Kubadinski, Pencho~~  
Popov, Dimitur  
Bashev, Ivan  
~~Avramov, Luchezar~~  
Dakov, Mako

~~Solakov, Angel~~  
Takov, Peko  
Daskalova, Svetla

~~Mishev, Misho~~

Belcheva, Dora  
Ivanov, Mariy  
Dzhurov, Dobri  
~~Vasilev, Stefan~~  
Popov, Konstantin  
Ignatov, Kiril

~~Pashev, Apostol~~  
Vachkov, Marin

Matev, Pavel

~~Zhivkov, Zhivko~~

Popov, Ivan  
Stefanov, Ninko

~~Tsolov, Tano~~

~~New appointment~~

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## BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED

Party boss Todor Zhivkov has reorganized top levels of the government and reshuffled personnel in a continuing effort to solve troublesome economic and administrative problems. The changes signify a recentralization of authority and a tightening of party control, in contrast to the cautious attempt in recent years to induce flexibility into the decision-making process.

Zhivkov's proposals were approved, apparently without opposition, at a party plenum on 26 December, and were ratified the next day by the National Assembly. Most of the changes, which touch nearly all the higher levels of the party, government, and even mass organizations, carry forward the directives of the plenum held last July. As envisaged then, Zhivkov's plan streamlines the functioning of the cabinet and consolidates various departments in the party's administrative apparatus.

Although the number of government ministries remains the same, the decision-making power has been compressed into fewer hands. Four of Zhivkov's deputy premiers were given ministerial portfolios. There were only two important, clear-cut demotions. The minister of foreign trade was replaced, probably because of the unsolved balance of payments problem. The minister of internal affairs fell victim to the government's desire to bring

more effective leadership into security affairs.

The party tightened its control over the economy, never significantly loosened, by consolidating economic-oriented ministries and creating a new Economic Coordination Committee. Zhivkov has appointed his first deputy for government affairs, Zhivko Zhivkov, to head the new committee and has given it a wide latitude of responsibility and power. The committee will be expected to solve the economic problems that have resulted from rapid but unbalanced growth and from overextension in Western credits. Other administrative changes point up Sofia's desire to de-emphasize its highly propagandized economic reform program, which was never actually implemented.

Moscow's harsh repression of the Czechoslovak experiment has not been lost on the Bulgarian leadership, and Sofia is apparently trying to form even closer ties with the USSR. Zhivkov probably coordinated his package plan with the Soviet leadership when he and two of his important deputies recently flew to Moscow for high-level consultations. Sofia is looking to Moscow for timely aid in coping with its serious economic and financial difficulties, and in return is giving unquestioning support to Moscow's international policies.

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## FRENCH STUDENTS CONTINUE MILITANT LINE

A measure of calm has returned to French universities following a number of serious incidents in December, but the student community remains in a volatile state. Moreover, actions taken recently by the major student union, the National Union of French Students (UNEF), suggest that students may take an even more militant attitude as the school year progresses. The UNEF has been in the forefront of the student movement in recent months, particularly after the ban on extremist organizations reduced the activity of other groups.

At its three-day national congress in late December, the UNEF decided to go beyond the role of defender of purely student interests and, despite opposition from Communist and moderate elements, plunged into the field of politics. The congress approved a statement describing the UNEF as a "mass political movement," and adopted a platform calling for defense of political liberties within the universities, rejection of the government's program for educational reform, and concerted action with the workers. This openly political posture is certain to arouse the ire of many in the government, and especially in the parliament, who strongly opposed even the limited amount of political freedom granted students in the education bill.

The UNEF's re-election of Jacques Sauvageot as its president

also points to the possibility of greater militancy in the universities. Sauvageot, a key leader in the student revolt last May, had stated prior to his election that the students are "preparing for the overthrow of the regime." The UNEF platform's call for concerted action with the workers is also supported by Sauvageot, who fears that otherwise students will be isolated. Workers and their union leaders remain wary of any close association with the students, however, and will probably try--as they have successfully in the past--to keep the protests and demands of the two groups separate.

The deep divisions that still exist among students may impair their ability to mount an effective protest against the government. At the congress, Sauvageot failed in his effort to integrate into the UNEF representatives from the extremist "action committees" that emerged during the May crisis. The committees, unable to unseat Sauvageot, withdrew from the congress and stated their intention to hold an assembly of their own this month.

Moderate and Communist students were also dissatisfied, not only with the political line adopted by the congress but also with what they believed was unfair treatment meted out by the majority. The short shrift given the orthodox Union of Communist Students by the UNEF congress reflects

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the hostility that has long marked relations between the Communist Party and French students, who see the party as part of the "establishment." The French Communist daily, L'Humanité, has already

protested the political role chosen by the congress, asserting that UNEF action as a "political striking force" would be directed against the organized workers' movement. [REDACTED]

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### COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AIRS DIFFERENCES

The conference of prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries in London from 7 to 15 January will again reveal wide differences on international questions, and will also produce a barrage of criticism of British policies.

The atmosphere of the conferences, held about every two years in London, has become increasingly tense over the last decade as newly independent Afro-Asian countries join the Commonwealth and use the meetings as a forum to air their grievances. The disparity of interests between such countries as, for instance, Australia and Swaziland, not to mention the bitter disputes between member states--notably India and Pakistan--has raised questions about the viability of the Commonwealth. This year's divisive issues include Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Britain's immigration policy.

Much to London's dislike, Rhodesia will again be a main topic of discussion. The last conference in September 1966 was devoted principally to this subject, and a threat of the African members to leave the organization was barely averted. This year the Africans will probably charge that Prime Minister Wilson broke his pledge of "no independence before majority rule" by the offers he recently made to Ian Smith. Wilson may attempt to con-

vert the Africans to a more "realistic" approach, but he will have rough going.

Britain and Nigeria will probably try to keep the Nigerian civil war off the main agenda, although Tanzania and Zambia can be expected to lobby on behalf of the Biafrans. The pro-Biafrans will assail the British policy of supplying arms to the federal side, and there may be some attempt to pass a resolution calling for an international arms embargo. Partly in anticipation of the Commonwealth meeting, the British launched their much-publicized peace initiative of last month. They will probably stress their numerous attempts to find a solution to both the political and humane aspects of the conflict.

Indira Gandhi intends to criticize recent British restrictions on Commonwealth immigration into the UK. In conjunction with some Caribbean members, India is expected to suggest the establishment of a special bureau in the Commonwealth secretariat that would be responsible for immigration problems and questions of race relations. The British, as well as the Australians and others, probably oppose this plan and will argue that it would infringe on national sovereignty. [REDACTED]

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## EUROPEAN SPACE PROGRAM FACES NEW CRISIS

Britain has plunged the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) into a new financial impasse and has cast a shadow over recently announced West European efforts to establish a unified space effort in the fields of launchers as well as applications and scientific satellites.

At a meeting of ELDO's council on 19-20 December, the British agreed to pay their \$23-million contribution to the 1969 budget only if they were relieved of any future obligation. London's 1970 share of the contemplated \$626-million total costs of the present ELDO program--aimed at development of the Europa II rocket--would have been \$17 million. Long opposed to European "duplication" of American capabilities in the launcher field, the UK had already made known its intention to withdraw from ELDO in 1971.

As a result of the British stand at the ELDO council meeting, France and Belgium refused to vote at all on the proposed 1969 budget. Moreover, the Italians reiterated that they might not pay their contribution for 1967 and 1968--already in arrears--nor that due for 1969. At European space meetings at Bonn in November, Rome had provisionally agreed to a compromise whereby it would accept a reduced ELDO budget--which cut projects

in which Italy would have had a role. In return, the French and Germans had agreed to purchase from the Italians--outside the scope of the ELDO program--a crucial booster motor for the French-German Symphonie communications satellite project. Bonn and Paris will now presumably have to take over development of this so-called apogee-perigee motor.

It is not clear what action Britain's ELDO partners may take if they are unable to persuade London to reconsider its position. At the least, France may find it a heavy burden--in its present economic difficulties--to assume a portion of the British default. At the Bonn meetings, the UK had agreed to continue to furnish its Blue Streak rocket--the first stage of the Europa II--even after 1971. Presumably, this commitment remains firm, but the UK's withdrawal from financing of the last phase of the present program will probably further delay ELDO's hope of having Europa II ready in time for a 1971 launching of the Symphonie.

ELDO ministers may meet in February to attempt to find a long-term solution to the new impasse. In the meantime, ELDO will finance its operations on a month-to-month basis, with payments not to exceed last year's level.

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## MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Arab-Israeli incidents continued at a high rate last week, highlighted by the Israeli attack on Beirut airport, which earned the Israelis a unanimous vote of condemnation by the UN Security Council. The raid has put Lebanon's fragile internal political balance in danger, and all security forces have been placed under army command to enforce a ban on demonstrations. There is some feeling that the government may have to change its generally pro-Western policies in order to hold the country together. The Soviet Union has already offered immediate military and economic aid to the Lebanese. Arab terrorist organizations seem bent on provoking more incidents from Lebanese territory, raising the prospect of further Israeli retaliation.

Trade accords signed on 28 December may increase Algeria's long-range economic dependence on the USSR. The Soviets agreed to purchase important quantities of wine and petroleum, and no longer will require annual balancing of trade between the two countries. Thus, the way may be open for an influx of Soviet goods not matched, in the short range at least, by Algerian exports.

Political unrest in Pakistan continued to be reflected in strikes, demonstrations, and protest marches as the new year opened. An aide to former foreign minister Bhutto has announced that Bhutto will oppose Ayub for the presidency in the 1969-70 elections. The announcement was probably designed to steal the initiative from other opposition leaders now meeting in Dacca in an effort to come up with a unified campaign strategy.

In Nigeria, frustration over the continuation of the stalemate in the civil war is growing as serious antitax rioting persists in the Western State. Throughout Nigeria the prolongation of the war is being attributed increasingly to Western support for Biafra, and there is growing criticism of the US decision to provide transport aircraft to relief agencies active in Biafra.

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## BEIRUT RAID HEIGHTENS MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS

The recent raid by Israeli commandos on Beirut airport appears to have aroused almost universal condemnation of Israel, while knitting Arab resistance more tightly together.

On 28 December, Israeli commandos attacked Beirut civil airport by helicopter and destroyed 13 civilian aircraft on the ground. There was virtually no Lebanese armed resistance, and the only casualties appear to have been Israelis. Damage now appears to be considerably less than the initial estimate of \$43.8 million, and was largely covered by insurance. The announced intention of the raid was to retaliate against Lebanon, which Israel claims connived in the Arab fedayeen attack on the El Al airliner in Athens airport earlier last week.

Both Lebanon and Israel took the matter to the UN Security Council, where, as expected, Israel was condemned unanimously. Most nations are appalled at the risks taken by Israel in attacking an international airport and deplore the extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict to international air traffic.

Beyond initial shock at the type and extent of Israeli retaliation, responsible world leaders generally believed that the "law of retaliation" adopted by Israel would not only be counterproductive in damping down Arab terrorism but would serve to heighten Arab

zeal. It is the stated objective of Arab resistance groups to draw reluctant or moderate Arabs into an active role in the struggle for Palestine. By punishing Beirut for the Athens incident, Israel may have greatly assisted the terrorists in forcing the reluctant Lebanese Government to join activist Arab nations.

Even the Israeli press has shown mixed feelings in dealing with the raid. Although newspapers of all political hues rationalize about the effectiveness and efficiency of the episode, there appears to be an underlying mood of pessimism about the present system of fighting terror with greater terror.

The Arab reaction has been predictable. The ineptness of the Lebanese defense has embittered the people and weakened still another moderate Arab regime. At the same time, the Lebanese now see the struggle with Israel from a more personal and committed point of view. The fedayeen smell success in the spate of publicity and have vowed a "rain" of revenge raids against Israel. Arab leaders have sensed that the public mood has quickened in response to the hardening of Israeli policy. King Husayn has once more called for an Arab summit meeting to assess the new danger of escalating tensions and to try to create more unity of purpose and military operations.

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## WAR-WEARINESS GROWS IN NIGERIA

War-weariness and frustration over the continuing military stalemate are growing in Nigeria, where federal authorities are becoming increasingly suspicious of US intentions. The Biafrans, who almost certainly see these developments as justification of their defense strategy, appear determined to hold out.

In the Western state, sporadic rioting over taxes persists, and there is increasing evidence among the Yoruba tribesmen of general disaffection with the state government, extending in some cases to the federal level. This malaise appears rooted in economic discontent, but includes a growing dissatisfaction with corruption among state officials and with the failure of the federal authorities to end the war. There are indications that such agitation will continue in the West and may spread to Yoruba elements in the Lagos state.

Frustration over the stalemate is becoming evident in northern Nigeria, where the federal authorities' inability to win

is being attributed increasingly to Western, and particularly US, support for Biafra. Press reports about US intentions to increase relief aid to the Biafrans were interpreted in the north as "aid and comfort to the enemy," and the recent US provision of airplanes to relief agencies flying to Biafra will almost certainly provoke a strong adverse reaction.

In Lagos, federal leader Gowon told the US ambassador that providing relief planes could have very serious consequences for US-Nigerian relations and requested further clarification of the US move. Gowon indicated his belief that this action gave more evidence of a US shift to a position of support for Biafra, and made public a strongly worded communiqué that could well spark anti-US demonstrations.

The Biafrans, who believe that if they hold out long enough the Lagos regime will fall apart, are now attempting to bolster their military position to stave off an expected major federal offensive. [REDACTED]

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## PAKISTANI OPPOSITION LEADERS MEET TO PLAN STRATEGY

A three-day strategy meeting of opposition leaders, scheduled to begin on 3 January in East Pakistan, may provide some measure of the disparate anti-government forces' ability to work together.

Leading government critic Asghar Khan plans to attend the meeting, which will reportedly include most other major opposition leaders, both independent and party-affiliated. If the group decides to contest the 1969-70 elections and back a single candidate, Asghar may be hoping that his enthusiastic support in West Pakistan, his recent warm reception in East Pakistan, and his reputation for honesty and integrity will make him the most acceptable man to oppose President Ayub Khan.

Several other opposition leaders have personal ambitions, however, and are probably also hoping for the bid. The acting chairman of ex-foreign minister Bhutto's People's Party announced Saturday that Bhutto--in jail since 13 November for inciting violence--will oppose Ayub for the presidency in 1970. Bhutto will not be able to attend the 3 January meeting, but his supporters probably hope that the announcement of his candidacy will steal the initiative from Asghar and other contenders. Initial reaction from within anti-government ranks to Bhutto's prospective candidacy, however, has been largely negative.

Various antigovernment groups continue to organize disturbances throughout the country. A highly effective general strike and a sizable, student-led protest march in Rawalpindi on 25 December resulted in violence and at least two reported deaths. Border militia were called in the following day to help the police maintain order. Rawalpindi students are reportedly planning further demonstrations to protest alleged police atrocities. In East Pakistan, pro-Peking leftists staged a rural strike on 29 December that apparently was effective only in scattered areas, largely at the periphery of the province. Several deaths were reported in Dacca, however. In responding to the continuing unrest in the country, the police--at times reinforced by the military--have been moving in to restore order but acting with restraint, apparently on orders from Ayub to avoid unnecessary violence, bloodshed, and charges of brutality.

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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Brazil's National Security Council announced on 30 December that thirteen politicians, including opposition leader Carlos Lacerda, have been stripped of their political rights. Ten of the thirteen were federal deputies from the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement, one was a deputy from the progovernment party, and one was a federal judge.

Panama's military junta [ ] prefers a "nonpartisan" presidential election in 1970 that would be outside the traditional political party system. The members of the 3-man Electoral Tribunal have been charged with revising the electoral code and are studying a plan that calls for a "popular consultation" that would select a president from several candidates hand-picked by the junta. Elections for a new National Assembly may be as far off as 1976.

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President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic has dissolved his palace intelligence service and has given its chief, Colonel Tejeda Alvarez, an ambassadorial post. Tejeda's close ties with the ambitious commander of the important First Brigade, Colonel Nivar Seijas, raise speculation that Balaguer believes it a convenient time to weaken Nivar's influence by removing one of his strongest allies.

Efforts to achieve a reconciliation between the secessionist Caribbean island of Anguilla and the Associated State of St. Kitts from which it withdrew have failed. Consequently, Anguilla council leader Robert Webster plans to declare total independence on 8 January. The main problem for the present moderate leaders of the small island would be that of finding a way to survive without substantial outside assistance.

Peru's military government appears to be actively seeking Latin American backing for its position on the International Petroleum Company (IPC) issue. The Peruvians hope to put pressure on the US to refrain from using economic sanctions against Peru, which has expropriated IPC property, but without compensation so far.

The Argentine Government has ended the 21-month-old wage freeze and has authorized an eight percent across-the-board salary hike. Other increases in the minimum wage and family allowances will probably raise average income per wage earner by 11 percent. [ ]

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## HAITIAN PRESIDENT PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS

President Duvalier has instituted additional security measures throughout Haiti in an effort to cope with recurrent terrorist activities, according to the US Embassy.

During the past two weeks, hit-and-run terrorist attacks were made on US installations for the first time. In mid-December, two bombing attempts were made against the US-Haitian binational center in Port au Prince. One of the bombs caused minor damage, but the other was found before it could be set off. In addition, fire destroyed the headquarters of the US-financed malaria eradication program. A small group of Communist activists may be responsible for the recent sabotage, but the possibility that some other groups were involved cannot be ruled out. Last July and August, Communist activists were blamed for a spate of terrorist incidents.

President Duvalier is also making changes in his immediate circle of advisers that are causing some political tension.

He apparently is attempting to patch up a family feud with his eldest daughter, Marie Denise, and her husband, Colonel Max Dominique, who were exiled to Europe in June 1967. In August 1968, Duvalier granted amnesty to Dominique and his family, and last month, Marie Denise returned to Haiti. She was subsequently appointed to an important palace position, replacing one of the President's close confidants. In a recent interview, Marie Denise said that her husband will join her within the next two weeks.

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The strong rivalries among members of the palace entourage apparently are now becoming increasingly bitter as a result.

The terrorism and palace intrigue are not likely to alter Duvalier's personal power position, but they will have an unsettling effect on over-all political conditions.

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